

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 25 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. M.B. BRIMAH

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROLANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN
Mr. V. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.I. CHEPROV
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN
Mr. V.B. TOULINOV

United Arab Republics:

Mr. H. KHALLAFF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. A.A. SALAM

Lord CHALFONT

Sir Harold BEELEY

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. C.G. BREW
Mr. A. NEEDLE
Mr. H. MOULTON

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the 286th plenary meeting of Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I am first on the list of speakers at today's meeting. If there is no objection, I shall speak in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union.

With this meeting the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament comes to an end. In view of the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly, it is necessary to sum up the results of our work since January of this year. Some delegations have already made an appraisal of the Committee's work this year and of the results achieved. It can be noted that, in doing so, some of them based themselves not so much on the facts as on a desire to present the state of affairs in the disarmament negotiations in the rosiest light possible. We, however, will be guided by the factual aspect of the matter, and from this point of view it will be correct to say that during the past six months of the Committee's work no real progress has been achieved either in the field of collateral measures or in the field of general and complete disarmament.

In saying that the Committee's work has failed to produce any positive results, we do not consider that the negotiations here have been useless. During the past two sessions quite a number of interesting and useful considerations, ideas and proposals have been put forward. On a number of important disarmament problems the positions of the various parties have been explained and clarified. A positive contribution to the consideration of disarmament questions has been made by the non-aligned countries members of the Committee. But that, of course, is not enough, and the absence of an agreed solution to any of the questions that were discussed cannot fail to give rise to serious concern.

For the negotiations to end differently, to be successful, one important condition was necessary and that was lacking: we did not discover in the United States and its partners in the Western blocs and alliances any readiness to reach agreement on the implementation of disarmament measures. The course of events shows clearly that the whole trend of the policy of the United States of America is not aimed at disarmament but, on the contrary, pursues the aim of escalating

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military operations and accelerating the arms race. This is shown, for example, by the fact that a few days ago the House of Representatives of the United States Congress approved a United States military budget of a record figure for the post-war years -- \$58,000 million.

The war of aggression in Viet-Nam is escalating more and more. Whereas at the time when the Committee began its work this year the armed forces of the United States in Indo-China numbered 180,000 men, by the end of this session the number has increased to 300,000. According to United States press reports, the tonnage of bombs dropped every week on Viet-Nam exceeds the tonnage dropped on Germany at the height of the Second World War. That is stated in an editorial article in The New York Times of 22 August 1966.

When one side follows a course which is contrary to the recommendations of the General Assembly on the question of disarmament and to the aims of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, it is difficult to expect to achieve agreement in our negotiations. Any proposal is deprived of the chance of being adopted if the real policy of one side is not aimed at accomplishing it. The approach of the United States of America, which gives priority to its military designs and its nuclear strategy plans over the interests of disarmament, has reduced to a minimum the possibility of making any progress in the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Thus, in regard to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, a pointer to the reluctance of the United States of America to reach agreements was the United States draft treaty on that subject (ENDC/152 and Add.1). As we have already stated repeatedly, it does not correspond to the recommendations of the General Assembly (A/RES/2028(XX); ENDC/161) and does not provide for effective measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. If one characterizes exactly the contents of that draft treaty, one can say that it is designed, not to solve the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but to regulate the use by non-nuclear Powers of the nuclear weapons received from nuclear Powers. To call the United States draft a "non-proliferation treaty" would be precisely to indulge in a play on words -- something the United States representative warned against at our meeting on 22 August (ENDC/PV.284, p.25).

Can it be said that the submission of such a draft treaty by the United States testifies to its intention to solve in a positive way the problem of preventing

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the spread of nuclear weapons? Of course it cannot. The intentions of the United States of America in this regard are clearly shown by the activities going on in NATO in regard to the "sharing of nuclear responsibility". This sharing is taking a more and more definite shape. Whereas at the beginning of our work the so-called McNamara Committee, which deals with the sharing of nuclear responsibility in NATO, was working on a temporary basis, the United States has now proposed to turn it into a permanent body. That proposal has no doubt given satisfaction to those who are seeking to broaden the participation of Western Germany in the elaboration, planning and implementation of nuclear strategy within the framework of NATO. But it cannot fail to put on their guard the participants in the disarmament negotiations.

The representatives of the Western Powers plead that the submission by the United States of amendments to its draft treaty is an indication of its desire to reach agreement. But a most impartial analysis of the United States amendments does not confirm this at all! These amendments changed nothing in the United States approach and could not in any way contribute to the success of the negotiations. They merely created a semblance of United States activity; whereas in actual fact there is a hard and absolutely uncompromising position, which can in no way serve as a basis for solving the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

The United States' position is determined by its reluctance to renounce the policy of nuclear co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany, which is in contradiction with the aim of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons as formulated in resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly. Although it voted for that resolution, the United States side in fact ignores it.

Influential circles in the United States of America regard a non-proliferation treaty as a "scrap of paper"; while nuclear co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany is considered to be the basic direction of United States foreign policy, an important factor in strengthening the United States military positions in Europe.

That policy, of course, encourages the forces of revanchism and militarism in Western Germany. It fosters in certain West German circles the illusion that the German question can be solved by way of the militarization of the Federal Republic of Germany, its access to nuclear weapons and the redrawing of the post-war boundaries. Thus harm is done to the co-operation of States in solving the problems of disarmament and, in particular, in solving the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

(The Chairman, USSR).

The United States tries to create the impression that the lack of progress in the negotiations on non-proliferation is due to the difficulty of finding mutually-acceptable formulas for a treaty on this subject. However, it is not a question of seeking for formulas but of the refusal of the United States to carry out in regard to nuclear questions within NATO such a policy as would be in keeping with the wishes of the United Nations General Assembly. The present policy of the United States in this regard does not correspond with the aim of reaching agreement on disarmament problems in general and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in particular. For this reason the position of the United States obliges the Eighteen-Nation Committee to mark time when considering the problem of non-proliferation.

We note with satisfaction the attempts of the non-aligned countries to contribute to the achievement of an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The detailed analysis of the situation regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which was made by the representative of Mexico in his statement at the Committee's 274th meeting is of interest. He showed that the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation would permit the geographical spread of nuclear weapons. We have already stated that we take a positive attitude towards the Mexican suggestion that a non-proliferation treaty should include an article to the effect that nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of States to conclude treaties for the purpose of ensuring the complete absence of nuclear weapons from their territories. We have also perused with interest the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries concerning non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/178). This memorandum will be studied by the Soviet side in the most careful way.

In view of the difficulties connected with the solution of this problem, we should like to point out that the attempts to link the question of non-proliferation with other measures, particularly with such measures as the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons by the Powers possessing such weapons, the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and so on, would in practice make the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons more complicated. It would be tantamount to putting forward conditions which might make it much more difficult to achieve an agreement, and run the risk of dooming to failure the whole business of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

(The Chairman, USSR)

It goes without saying that the Soviet Union does not by any means look on the achievement of an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as an end in itself, but desires to push on from the solution of this problem to the complete prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons. We have said this time and again, and we deem it necessary to emphasize our approach once more. The problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is not only important but also calls for urgent solution. The Soviet Union is prepared to continue its efforts to achieve such a solution. We appeal to all members of the Committee to realize the importance of making every possible effort to accomplish this task.

The Soviet delegation must also declare that we cannot be satisfied with the state of affairs in solving the problem of banning underground nuclear tests. Here too the reason for the unsatisfactory situation is the lack of readiness on the part of the United States to reach agreement on a realistic and practical basis -- on the basis of the use of national means of verifying the observance of a ban on underground nuclear tests. In order to achieve an agreement to ban such tests a political decision is required, a decision which the United States of America is evading in every way.

In analysing the state of affairs in this regard, we cannot fail to note the assessment of the situation which was made in a leading article in The New York Times of 17 August. In that article it was pointed out that: "The reluctance of the Pentagon to halt underground testing has emerged as the chief obstacle to its acceptance..." (The New York Times, International Edition, 17 August 1966, p.4). That is, the proposal to ban underground tests.

We note the important and useful role played by the representatives of the non-aligned countries in the examination of the problem of banning nuclear weapons tests. The memorandum submitted by them on this subject (ENDC/177) is of definite interest and will be studied with due attention by the Soviet side.

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The Soviet Union, as we have already stated, is prepared to reach agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests on the basis of the proposal of the United Arab Republic to prohibit the carrying out of underground tests above a certain threshold and the proclamation of a moratorium on tests of lesser magnitude (ENDC/PV.259, pp.27 *et seq.*). On this basis it would long ago have been possible to put an end to underground tests of nuclear weapons if the other side had been willing to do so. But the representatives of the Western Powers in the Committee do not wish to take this proposal of the United Arab Republic into account. We are also prepared to consider positively the question of international co-operation in exchanging seismological data with a view to creating a better basis for the assessment of seismic events, provided that by this means it will be possible to arrive at the conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear explosions.

We are convinced that the problem of banning underground tests will be solved if the United States of America gives priority to its solution over the military considerations and plans which at present predominate in its attitude towards the question of such tests. That is why, in answer to the calls which have been made in the Committee for a study by scientific experts of the problem of detecting and identifying seismic events, we wish to emphasize that the delay in solving the question of banning underground tests is due not to reasons of a scientific nature but to the political and military considerations of the United States.

Our position of principle is that no international inspection is needed in order to verify the observance of an agreement to discontinue underground nuclear tests. The proposal to exercise control over the banning of such tests on the basis of "inspection by challenge or invitation" is absolutely unacceptable to the Soviet Union, as it is aimed at pushing through in a disguised form the idea of international inspections.

It is regrettable that, despite the recommendations of the General Assembly (A/RES/2032(XX); ENDC/161), the Committee has also failed to make progress in solving the problem of banning the use of nuclear weapons. Such a situation is once again the result of the obvious reluctance of the United States and its NATO partners to examine and solve this problem. If the Western side wished to solve this question, it would be possible to do so without any great difficulty and in a short time. There do not arise in connexion with it the many complex questions which are inherent in other disarmament problems. Thus the question of control is very simple. The problem

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of security is solved in an equally favourable manner for all States. In order to make it easier for the Western Powers to accept this proposal, the Soviet side put forward the idea that the nuclear Powers should assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (ENDC/167, p.3). But even this simple and necessary proposal has been ignored by the Western Powers.

The reason for this attitude of the United States of America and its allies is that nuclear weapons are the very basis of their military arrangements and preparations. They do not conceive the planning of military-strategic operations without having the possibility of using nuclear weapons. In this, as in other cases, we come up against always the same obstacle in solving disarmament questions: in the United States military arguments and concepts have priority over the solution of the problem of disarmament and of ensuring international security on this basis.

In connexion with the problem of banning the use of nuclear weapons we note with interest the initiative of Ethiopia, whose representative, Mr. Aberra, has submitted to the Committee a memorandum (ENDC/180) on banning the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries not having nuclear weapons on their territory, and against denuclearized regions and zones. Ethiopia's initiative is a step which aims at putting some restriction on the use of nuclear weapons. The Ethiopian proposal will be examined by the Soviet side with all due attention.

As a result of the negative attitude of the United States of America and some of its allies, the solution of the question of establishing denuclearized zones in the most dangerous areas of the world, where considerable military forces are concentrated and confront each other, has been held up for many years. Yet the declaring of the United States and areas to be denuclearized zones and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against such zones would be an important disarmament measure that would contribute to the strengthening of security in individual areas and thereby to the improvement of the international situation as a whole. Particularly important would be the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, where the armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries face each other. The Polish People's Republic has put forward an important proposal for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in that area and for the freezing of nuclear weapons there (ENDC/C.1/1; PV.189, p.6). Of great importance is the proposal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic (ENDC/151, 168) that no nuclear weapons should be located on the territories of the two German States. We support the proposals for the establishment of denuclearized

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zones in Northern Europe (DC/201/Add.2), in the Balkans and Adriatic (ENDC/PV.168, p.16), in the Mediterranean (ENDC/91) and in other parts of the world.

Owing to the negative attitude of the Western Powers no progress has been made in examining and solving the question of the elimination of foreign military bases on the territory of other countries and the withdrawal of foreign troops therefrom. Although the implementation of such measures would result in eliminating important sources of international tension and military conflicts and would be of enormous importance for normalizing the situation in the world, this question has not been given in the Committee the attention that it deserves. The representatives of the Western Powers have passed over this question in silence, despite the fact that there is a resolution of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly calling on all colonial Powers to dismantle military bases in colonial territories and not to establish new ones there (A/RES/2105(XX)).

The tactic of silence was used by the representatives of the United States and other Western Powers in regard to all the collateral measures in the field of disarmament which to any extent affect their military plans. In these cases also the Western delegations were unwilling to take into account the existing resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and its direct instructions to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/161).

In order to give the members of the Committee a correct idea of the programme of collateral measures in the field of disarmament which the Soviet Union has put forward (ENDC/123, 167), allow me to recall that this programme includes proposals for a reduction in the military budgets of States, for a reduction in the numbers of armed forces and conventional weapons, for the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, and other proposals. The adoption and implementation of these measures would help towards lessening international tension and halting the arms race. In our statements we did not dwell on these measures, not because we did not consider them worthy of attention but because, for the sake of achieving concrete decisions as rapidly as possible, we gave priority to those questions in regard to which there were recommendations and instructions to the Committee on the part of the United Nations General Assembly.

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The representatives of the Western Powers have reproached us for not giving proper attention to the United States proposals (ENDC/120) for a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes and for a freeze of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It is strange to hear such reproaches from those who pass over in silence the proposals which have been referred to the Committee by the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. As regards the substance of the United States proposals, we have repeatedly made it clear that they would not lead to a diminution of the danger of a nuclear war but are merely a reflection of the "crisis of overproduction" of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in the United States. These United States proposals pursue the aim of securing unilateral advantages for the United States. Their detailed examination would merely divert the Committee from examining and agreeing on more important and realistic problems of disarmament.

While considering it very important to achieve agreement on the accomplishment of collateral measures in the field of disarmament, the Soviet Union never overlooks the fact that the basic and most important task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee is to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament. It was only after repeated calls on the part of the socialist and non-aligned countries that the Western delegations deemed it possible to deal with this problem in their statements.

In fact the Western delegations put into practice the idea that in negotiations on disarmament it is not worth while going into the problem of general and complete disarmament in all its magnitude, and that it is quite sufficient to examine only the approaches to this problem. We are urged not to bother about "the end of the road", not to think about the final goal. We cannot agree with that approach; it is merely a veiled attempt to refrain altogether from seeking a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament. Here too the military plans and concepts of the United States and its allies must give way to the insistent demand of all nations that weapons and war should be excluded from the life of mankind. We urge all delegations not to lose sight of the need to work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament and to give to this problem the attention it deserves.

In summing up the work of the Committee between the two sessions of the General Assembly, we must draw the conclusion that the main reason for the absence of concrete solutions to disarmament questions is that the United States of America considers any

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measure in the field of disarmament from the point of view of the possible military-strategic and political advantages and gains to be derived from the implementation of such a measure. This conclusion of ours is the natural outcome of the analysis we have made of the state of the negotiations on the individual disarmament questions to which the Committee has devoted most attention this year. In considering all these questions the United States of America has invariably given priority to the aim of strengthening its own military position. By speeding up to an incredible extent the arms race which is going on at the same time as the escalation of United States aggression in Viet-Nam, the United States has created and is creating considerable obstacles in the way of the solution of the basic problems of disarmament.

The question may arise whether in these circumstances there is any possibility of making progress at all in the matter of disarmament. The Soviet side considers that, whatever the conditions and difficulties connected with the negotiations on disarmament, the task of achieving progress in this field cannot be set aside nor can our efforts in this direction be slackened. The Soviet Union has endeavoured and will continue to endeavour to seek for ways to slow down and end the arms race, and in the first place the nuclear arms race, and to reach agreement on practical steps in the field of disarmament. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, stated at the seventh session of the Supreme Soviet: "The Soviet Union bases itself on the premise that the struggle for disarmament is not a tactical move, but a position of principle, an integral part of Soviet foreign policy."

In the approach to this problem there must be new and energetic efforts, initiative and, above all, a readiness to find a way to overcome the existing difficulties. We hope that in the subsequent stages of the consideration of this problem progress will at last be made and agreement reached on the implementation of measures in the field of disarmament. For its part the Soviet Union will exert every effort to that end.

That is the end of my statement as representative of the Soviet Union.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I have listened, as always, with very great interest to the statement just made by you as a representative of the Soviet Union. I would hesitate to characterize it as polemical, but perhaps I might say that it was a powerful, if slightly one-sided, statement of the point of view of the Soviet Union.

As you have said, Mr. Chairman, we are at the end of another session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and this is clearly no time to exchange disoblaging reflections on each other's point of view. Indeed I wonder sometimes, as I expect all of us do, what exactly is the point of coming to this chamber twice a week to make speeches, to exchange ideas and drafts and to try again and again to find our way over or around the same obstacles, especially as those obstacles are not matters of language and drafting but are caused by the suspicion of nation by nation, by the mutual incomprehension by one State of another's system and way of thought. I am not a wholehearted admirer of the philosophy of John Locke, but in recent years I have come to understand very clearly what he meant when he said: "New opinions are always suspected and usually opposed without any other reason but because they are not already common."

This comment on the nature of our deliberations here may sound like despair, but I ask you to believe that it is not. I believe that we should acknowledge the fact that suspicion exists. Indeed it is one of the characteristic features of a political system based on the concept of the nation-State. So long as a nation's security rests on its force of arms, then governments responsible for the security of their own countries, and more especially those governments which are also largely responsible for the security of a third of the globe, will inevitably approach with enormous caution any proposal which entails a radical change in the way in which that security is ensured. The representative of the Soviet Union may be tempted to deny that his Government is subject to such pressures. He may point to the radical nature of some of his proposals for disarmament. However, the fact is that we all know quite well that those proposals are not likely to lead to immediate agreement; and the attitude of the Soviet Union in looking at some of the aspects of the various collateral measures -- particularly those involving the entry of foreigners into that country -- is marked by a degree of caution at least as great as any shown by the West.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

It is true that most of mankind has always yearned for peace, and most reasonable people today have become convinced that since the invention of nuclear weapons peace can eventually be ensured only through disarmament. As I said at one of our recent meetings when quoting from one of President Kennedy's speeches, peace consisting merely of the absence of war is no longer tolerable, because such a peace is too precarious and the consequences of a war too dreadful (ENDC/PV.281, p.21). Governments in general believe that too. When it comes down to the hard facts of life, to a choice of disarmament measures, the natural caution of governments means that ideas on what can be accepted change very slowly. However, they do change; and I believe that our discussions here, frustrating as they may seem at times, play an important part in changing them.

Our negotiations here have refined ideas and clarified issues that a year or so ago were still crude and often confused. We all know now what are the specific obstacles to agreement at least on the two most important measures we have discussed this year. We have all acquired a fairly precise idea of the shape which a compromise must take if we are to obtain agreement on a non-proliferation treaty or on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In many countries of the world educated public opinion is also becoming aware of the shape of that compromise. Public pressures are building up in many countries to induce their governments to move in the required direction.

It will of course be necessary, as has been said many times before, for the communist Governments, some of whom may be less directly affected by those pressures, to take corresponding decisions about their own policies and positions. I must confess that, when I listen to some of the speeches of the Warsaw Pact delegations in this Committee, their attitudes and their assumptions seem to me to have become fossilized over the years, to have been unaffected by the way in which the world has changed.

I shall not pursue that thought any further in general terms or I shall undoubtedly be accused of being controversial, but I think one thing is worth saying. I have appealed before, and I make no apology for doing so again, for the Soviet Union and its allies to abandon their preoccupation with the damage suffered during the last war at the hands of Hitler's forces. It has been said -- I think, with some truth -- that statesmen tend to be so busy preventing the last war that they fail to prevent a future one. The problem we have to face extends far beyond the

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continent of Europe. It is a global problem and it requires a global solution. It calls for the exercise of vision and courage and the rejection of sterile parochialism -- of the European or any other type.

Turning now to the particular subjects upon which we have concentrated here in this Committee, I should like to repeat that my Government still regards agreement on a treaty to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons as the most urgent proposal before the Committee. Here time is not on our side, as to some extent it is over the question of a comprehensive test ban, where scientific means of detecting and identifying underground events are improving all the time. As far as a non-proliferation treaty is concerned, if we do not succeed soon it will be too late to succeed at all. At this last meeting of the session I do not propose to look in detail at the two draft treaties. I think it is a pity that we could not agree to try to map out an area of agreement with undoubtedly exists between them, as was earlier suggested by the representatives of Canada (ENDC/PV.270, p.19) and of Italy -- a suggestion repeated in the Italian delegation's paper (ENDC/179) submitted on 20 August.

However, it may be useful to look at another area of agreement: at the common purpose which lies behind both drafts; in particular, at the purpose shared by the nuclear Powers represented at this Conference. My delegation has always been, and still is, fully aware of the considerations advanced by the non-aligned countries in our discussions, their wish for some assurance that their security will not suffer if and when a treaty is signed, and their quite understandable desire that, in conjunction with a treaty, the nuclear Powers should take some concrete steps to curb the arms race. Their joint memorandum (ENDC/178) sets out those considerations firmly and fairly. They are considerations we must take into full account in working out a compromise between the positions adopted by the nuclear alliances.

Although the positions of the nuclear Powers and their allies still diverge in some important respects, I should like for a moment to concentrate on the other side of the coin, the identity of purpose which the three nuclear Powers present here share. As the representative of Czechoslovakia put it on 21 July, speaking of the proper effect of a non-proliferation treaty: "It would, however, prevent the capability to start a nuclear war from being acquired by still further States in addition to the existing nuclear Powers" (ENDC/PV.275, p.5) The representative of the United States expressed his full acceptance of that formula at the following meeting (ENDC/PV.276, p.10) and he reiterated that concept on 23 August (ENDC/PV.284, p.25). My delegation equally would support it.

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I do not say this, and I am sure the United States representative did not say it, with the intention of scoring points in debate. It would, I think, be a sad day if any member of one of the two alliances felt that he had given away a trick because a member of the other alliance agreed with him. I ask the Czechoslovak delegation and other members of the Committee to believe that we are equally sincere in that aim. Perhaps this may sound like a platitude; but I think it is important. Recognition of our identity of aim is sometimes lost in the propaganda and polemics which, regrettably, have sometimes embittered our discussions. I must ask the representative of the Soviet Union to consider seriously the danger that that aim may be jeopardized if his country persists in its present apparent refusal to change its current draft treaty in any respect.

I am not claiming that the Western draft is perfect. We do our best. Amendments to the first United States draft have already been submitted (ENDC/152/Add.1). It may be possible to find a formulation different from either of the present texts which would satisfy both alliances, and it seems to me certain that such a formulation will be needed before we can hope to secure final agreement. However, in any negotiation, both sides must be prepared to negotiate. The representative of the Soviet Union can scarcely expect the West to go on making modifications in the Western draft without showing the slightest willingness to express the intentions of his own Government in more relevant and more precise language.

I shall not attempt today to analyse once again the precise nature of the difference that has to be resolved here. It is, as I have said, clear to everyone in this Committee, and what is needed to resolve it is the exercise of political will. I should, however, like to comment briefly on one aspect of the conflict in our positions: the aspect of control of nuclear weapons. I am not concerned here with the question of the physical means of controlling nuclear weapons, except perhaps to remark in passing that the physical controls which the Soviet Union regards with such suspicion form an indispensable part of the control system on which any nuclear-weapon State must rely ultimately to prevent a nuclear weapon from being fired by an unauthorized person or a madman. My main point concerning control is this.

You, Mr. Chairman, speaking as the Soviet representative, have said (ENDC/PV.252, p.9; PV.269, p.34) that your Government was not prepared to base the security of the Soviet Union on the promise of a veto by the United States Government. But the draft treaties on non-proliferation themselves consist, in the last analysis

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of solemn promises. They are, it is true, promises in treaty form, but they are backed only by very limited arrangements to ensure that those promises will be kept. In any agreement there must be the ingredient of trust and belief in the good faith of the other side; and we shall certainly obtain no effective agreement in the climate of intense suspicion with which, for example, the Soviet Union regards the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany and the related suspicion that the nuclear-weapon States that are members of NATO are bent on bringing into being new collective forces armed with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and its allies contend that the plans of the West for what has come to be called "nuclear sharing" will result, either with the connivance of the nuclear States or because they may allow themselves to be duped, in proliferation within the Western alliance.

I know that you, Mr. Chairman, are given to quoting from stories and articles in the Western Press -- usually with the implied suggestion that they are authoritative. Indeed, you have given us two more examples this morning. Obviously the Soviet delegation follows the Western Press assiduously. If it does, it must surely be aware that many of the proposals for changes in the organization and deployment within the Western alliance, and many ideas about the disposition and control of nuclear weapons which have been freely and copiously discussed in past years, are no longer regarded in the West as practical or useful possibilities. It is that ill-founded and troublesome suspicion, for which real grounds do not exist, that is to a large extent the obstacle to a treaty. So much for our differences over the spread of nuclear weapons.

The other immediately practicable measure of disarmament which we have discussed at length during this year is a treaty to prevent all nuclear testing. Such a treaty would obviously form a worthy complement to a non-proliferation treaty. Here too we have a useful memorandum by the eight non-aligned countries (ENDC/177), setting out the problem in some detail and outlining possible ways in which a solution may be found. The last meeting that we devoted fully to this subject -- our 280th meeting -- seemed to me to show that there is now a good chance of reaching agreement on a total test ban, perhaps for a trial period to begin with; and I believe that the basis for such an agreement can be found somewhere in the new proposals or the new variations on old themes which have been produced this year. I very much hope that you, Mr. Chairman, speaking as the representative of the Soviet Union, have not said your

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last word on those new variations; and, as I suggested in my last intervention (ENDC/PV.283, p.23), I hope that your remarks at our 280th meeting applied to the existing Western position rather than to any of the possibilities for the future.

It is a matter for regret, too, that we have seen no progress on other collateral measures designed to slow down and halt the arms race by direct and obvious methods: the proposals for a freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles and a cut-off of fissile materials (ENDC/120). I am most encouraged to see that those measures are mentioned in the non-aligned countries' memorandum. My delegation is still hoping for a serious examination of those proposals by the Soviet Union.

I should not conclude my remarks today without expressing a more general word of welcome for the two memoranda (ENDC/177 and 178) submitted by the non-aligned members of this Committee. My delegation much admires and is grateful for the constructive and important part played by the eight non-aligned countries in our debate, offering, as they so often do, wise and cogent advice from a standpoint free from the preoccupations of a nuclear State or its allies -- advice which we, the nuclear countries, and our allies would ignore only at very great risk to ourselves. The two memoranda are useful and helpful examples of that.

I should also mention the memorandum (ENDC/180) submitted earlier this week by the representative of Ethiopia, which my delegation is studying with the care and attention that it deserves. As I have made clear in the past, Her Majesty's Government regards the formation of nuclear-free zones as an important and practical measure of arms control. We have already seen useful progress towards a Latin-American nuclear-free zone; although I, like my Canadian colleague, who spoke yesterday, am sorry to learn that the meetings in Mexico City have had to be postponed. As the representative of Ethiopia pointed out, the political tensions in Africa present grave problems for peace, and it is all the more urgent and important to reduce and remove those tensions. The removal of the possibility of introducing nuclear weapons into that continent would be a valuable measure to that end.

In conclusion, I should like to say this. Earlier in my remarks I spoke of the slow shift in governments' policies and of the part we in this Committee play in that movement; but the fact is that as a Conference we have little cause for satisfaction of self-congratulation as we look back at this year's work. Against the background of the slow change of the opinions and policies of our countries, the

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brute force of events operates at quite a different pace. The arms race continues. Existing tensions and conflicts, at present contained with difficulty, may break out from their present limits. We do not know exactly how much time we have, but we do know that not very long remains.

However, let us not say categorically, as the representative of Czechoslovakia did at our 284th meeting of 23 August (ENDC/PV.284, p.27) -- let none of us say that that is the other man's fault. No one of us here has a monopoly of right. We must examine our own positions as carefully and critically as we are ready to examine those of others. We in the West do not suggest that all the fault for our frustration lies at the door of the Soviet Union and its allies; but movement, or rapprochement, or compromise -- call it whatever we will -- the true spirit of negotiation, in any case, is essential to all the members of this Committee if we are to achieve the aims to which, I believe, we are all sincerely dedicated.

As I have said before more than once in this Committee, we shall gain nothing by prophesying doom, or by regarding this or that date or this or that session of the United Nations as the last chance to agree upon disarmament. There can never be a last chance for disarmament. Whatever the frustrations and whatever the disappointments, we shall go on trying to agree, because we must.

However, having said that, I must also say that I believe quite seriously that the world is now moving into a period of great and perhaps unprecedented danger. In the past twenty years we have grown accustomed to a sort of nuclear stalemate, to a balance between the two great power blocs of the world, that has preserved some sort of peace. It has been an uneasy and incomplete peace perhaps, but nevertheless we have been spared the appalling destruction of a war between the two great nuclear Powers. I believe that that balance is beginning to disappear. Unless we can reach agreement soon on some of the modest steps of arms control and disarmament that we have been discussing this year, the developments of the next fifteen to twenty years may put disarmament beyond our reach for a very long time.

In the Far East a country of 700 million people with one of the largest standing armies in the world is developing nuclear weapons and may quite soon be able to strike with those weapons at any country in the world if it should want to do so. The recent political changes in communist China have, so far as we understand them, done little to reassure us about what the future aims of that country might be. It is not only the possible emergence of China as a nuclear super-Power that might upset

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the balance. If other countries should succumb to the pressures and temptations that will bear increasingly upon them in the years to come, if a sixth, seventh or eighth nuclear Power should emerge, there can be little doubt in anyone's mind that the danger of a nuclear war would immeasurably increase.

Finally, I think we should be foolish to ignore the dangers that are inherent in the growing scientific and technological revolution. Even since we began this session of the Disarmament Conference there have been discoveries that might, unless we show great wisdom and imagination in their use, lead to another and perhaps irreversible turn in the spiral of the arms race. This is not simply a matter of nuclear technology --- the construction of nuclear weapons is no longer the great secret it once was. The new revolution is in such fields as the computer and other methods of data processing which are bringing about a complete transformation in the science of devising, creating and controlling weapon systems.

For us here the most immediate implication of all this is likely to be in the field of defence against ballistic missiles. A year or so ago few people would have believed that it was possible, even at enormous expense, to deploy an effective defence against ballistic missiles; but today a great deal of the discussion of such deployment is in terms not so much of whether to deploy them but of when. On the other hand, the representative of the United States, in his speech at our meeting of 16 August (ENDC/PV.282, p.13) made it clear that the United States was anxious to include such systems in any freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles. I believe we should be in no doubt that the deployment of anti-missile systems might, as I have suggested, take the arms race into a new dimension and put off all hope of disarmament agreements for many years.

An even more frightening aspect is that, with the increasing technical development, a situation may soon arise in which any response to a nuclear attack, or even to the apparently imminent threat of a nuclear attack, will be in the hands --- if they can be called hands --- not of responsible human beings, not of the persons who take political decisions, but of computers and business machines. That is the sort of world which I think Brecht had in mind when writing his famous play Galileo. He had Galileo saying to the scientists:

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"With time you may discover all that is to be discovered, and your progress will only be a progression away from mankind. The gulf between you and them can one day become so great that your cry of jubilation over some new achievement may be answered by a universal cry of horror."

For all those reasons I believe that we should look upon the next few years, the next ten years perhaps, as critical years in the pursuit of peace. If we can overcome the suspicion and the mistrust that divide nation from nation, if we can learn to control and to use with humility and compassion the forces that we are bringing into being, if we can match the cleverness of scientists with the wisdom of politicians, we may be able to provide for ourselves and for our children not only a world of peace but a world in which the benefits of a scientific revolution can banish the evils of poverty, hunger and disease. If we fail, the best we can hope for is a world of eternal conflict, destruction and misery; at the very worst, we might not survive at all. That is the measure of the task that will still face each one of us when we leave this room today.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I listened with interest, of course, to the remarks you made in your capacity as representative of the Soviet Union and also to the remarks of the representative of the United Kingdom. I was sorry to hear in your remarks, Sir, an attack on the action which the United States is taking to help a Government which is being attacked from the North to defend itself, but I do not think it appropriate or necessary to add anything here to what I have already said on the subject.

In the closing days of this session our Committee has received memoranda representing the views of the eight non-aligned nations and individual members of this body. We are happy to have those memoranda. I have already commented briefly on some of them and will elaborate further in my remarks this morning. I should like to mention that we have also received the memorandum (ENDC/180) submitted to this Committee on 23 August by the representative of Ethiopia. We have not had time to study that carefully or to complete our examination of it, but, while it seems to contain some sentiments which we can all share, I should point out that there are certain suggestions in it with which we have difficulty in agreeing and others which are not clear to us at the moment.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

This is the last meeting of this session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is fitting and proper that as this session comes to an end we should review what we have accomplished and what we have not accomplished.

This session has been one of the periods in the life of the Committee in which we have not been able to record progress in concrete agreements. It is natural that we should be disappointed at that; but we must not let concern with the past prevent us from looking at the present and towards the future. The questions we must ask ourselves today as we leave this room are the following. What problems are we working on at the present time? How important are those problems in the context of the concerns of today? What progress are we making towards solving those problems or laying the basis for solving them in the near future?

The United States believes that this Committee is now working on urgent problems, that those problems are of vital importance in the context of today and that we are making real progress in our efforts to solve them.

On Tuesday I spoke about the status of our negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/PV.284, pp.20 et seq.), and I do not wish to go over that ground again today. I will confine my remarks today to pointing out that on Tuesday I discussed a number of the crucial issues involved in a non-proliferation treaty on which we think we have made progress. I indicated the determination of the United States to work towards a rapprochement in which each side walks its part of the way towards mutual understanding. The United States hopes, with the greatest personal respect, that our Soviet colleagues in this endeavour will join us in the same spirit.

As part of our efforts to obtain a non-proliferation treaty, and independently, we have sought to secure the widest application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards in connexion with peaceful nuclear activities so that other nations may know that they are in fact peaceful. We have tried to do so in a manner which takes into account the view of a number of delegations -- expressed both at the formal meetings here and in informal discussions -- that a system of safeguards should be non-discriminatory. It is for that reason that the scheme of safeguards which my delegation has set forth contains safeguard obligations in regard to the indigenous nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States and, in addition, safeguard obligations in regard to transfers of fissionable materials

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and specialized equipment which would have application across the board to all States -- nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

I should now like to speak about a proposal which has come to be widely recognized as having enormous potential both as a non-proliferation measure and as a measure to contain the nuclear arms race more generally. The complete cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes has in recent days been specifically recognized in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries as an effective non-proliferation measure. I am referring, of course, to the statement by the non-aligned countries that a complete cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes and a test ban are both in themselves effective non-proliferation measures (ENDC/178).

On 11 August the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, put before us specific suggestions concerning the way in which we might move forward to an actual agreement. She suggested the date of 1 July 1967 as "an agreed target date both for the cessation of current production and for the elaboration of a treaty" (ENDC/PV.281, p.4). She also presented an alternative suggestion. She said:

"... if they" -- and here she was referring to the nuclear-weapon countries -- "are really sitting down to a serious study of the practical requirements for a phasing-out of the production in question, we ought to be prepared to envisage a flexible pattern -- that is, a series of dates for closure of various sectors of the production, some perhaps later but some, it is hoped, earlier than the date which I have indicated in a tentative way and for the purpose of discussion." (ibid.)

The United States supports Mrs. Myrdal's proposal. Specifically, we are prepared to accept 1 July 1967 as a target date for concluding an international agreement on a verified halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons. We are prepared also, should this prove to be the desire of the parties concerned, to work out a step-by-step halt in production, of the kind suggested by our Swedish colleague. We assume that such a measure also would be embodied in an adequately verified international agreement. A possibility which seems to us to be an easy and important first step would be an agreement on reciprocal plant-by-plant shut-down of reactors by the United States and the Soviet Union of the kind I discussed on 11 August (ibid., pp.12 *et seq.*).

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

I have stated that an agreement on a cut-off should contain adequate procedures for verification, and we believe that to be the case. However, we do not believe that that should present any fundamental obstacle to our work. In order to find simple yet practical means of inspection, the United States has undertaken applied research on the methods of verifying a cut-off. The results of that research have been presented to this Committee in detail in a working paper (ENDC/176), and we have also presented for all the delegations here a technical briefing on the subject. We hope that the demonstration this autumn at Hanford, in the United States, will persuade the States represented here, as well as others, of the ease and unobtrusiveness with which it is possible to verify the shut-down of a reactor.

With regard to verification, we have already pointed out that in the context of a cut-off agreement the nuclear-weapon Powers would accept the same degree of verification as that which we have proposed for the non-nuclear-weapon Powers as being appropriate to safeguard a non-proliferation agreement. It will be recalled that we have also made clear our view that a cut-off agreement should not be made a pre-condition for a non-proliferation treaty. At this point I should say that I was happy, Mr. Chairman, to hear the observation you made in your capacity as representative of the Soviet Union to the effect that you too felt that a cut-off agreement should not be made a pre-condition for a non-proliferation treaty.

If we are to meet the deadline proposed by the representative of Sweden, negotiations should proceed forthwith. The United States is prepared to continue negotiations on the subject among interested parties either in the autumn or as soon as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumes work after the consideration of the disarmament question by the General Assembly.

I wish to turn now to our efforts to make progress on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The United Nations General Assembly has asked us (A/RES/2032(XX); ENDC/161) to give urgent consideration to that problem, and I believe we have done so. For the United States, an adequately verified test ban remains a primary objective. However, our desire to see a comprehensive test-ban treaty concluded is not reflected in our protestations alone; it is demonstrated by actions -- actions in undertaking extensive and expensive research programmes which have only one aim in sight. That aim, for us, is a comprehensive test-ban treaty with adequate verification.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The United States does not seek inspections merely for the sake of inspections. We seek inspections because we do not believe we can prudently undertake obligations which would limit our freedom of action in an important security area unless we have reassurance that our partners in an agreement are observing the same limitations on their freedom of action as those we are observing on ours. In the present state of scientific knowledge, we believe, that reassurance can be provided only by the possibility of on-site inspections.

However, we wish to make on-site inspections as practical and as unobtrusive as possible. That is why on 4 April my delegation described simplified means of conducting on-site inspections (ENDC/PV.254, pp.21 et seq.). We continue to hope that our desire to facilitate agreement by those steps will be matched by increasing realism and confidence on the part of other participants in these negotiations.

I believe that it is appropriate now to refer to the joint memorandum (ENDC/177) of the eight non-aligned delegations of 17 August on a comprehensive test ban. That memorandum appears to recognize by implication that national means of detection cannot furnish adequate assurance to a country which has forsworn all nuclear testing. It also calls attention to the proposal for international co-operation to improve seismic data so as to create a better scientific basis for the evaluation of seismic events. The United States is sympathetic to that idea.

In all candour, however, I think it appropriate that I should make clear now that some of the suggestions contained in that memorandum give the United States great difficulty. For example, the position of the United States against an unverified moratorium on nuclear testing is well known, and I do not need to elaborate on it here. In addition, as I pointed out in my remarks on 4 April (ENDC/PV.254, pp.19 et seq.) dealing with verification of a test ban by challenge -- we have since called it "challenge or invitation", "consent", "inquiry" and "response", and I think it is not unimportant from a semantic point of view that we have been seeking the best way to phrase it -- our feeling has been that, if there are differences concerning how verification of a comprehensive test ban should be carried out, they should be settled before we enter into a test-ban treaty, not afterwards.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

A suggestion was made at the Scarborough conference this summer, and later recommended for consideration to our Committee by the representative of the United Kingdom, for a trial suspension of nuclear testing. Under that suggestion, during the trial suspension period there would be verification by a system of inspection by challenge so that we could have some idea of how it would actually work. As I indicated in my remarks on 4 August (ENDC/PV.279, p. 32), that is a new idea, and the United States has it under study. At the same meeting, I raised certain questions on which the views of the Soviet Union would be welcome (ibid., p.33). Its views would greatly facilitate our study.

We also think it is a sign of continuing interest in our work -- a sign of a continuing desire to get to the bottom of important scientific facts involved in our negotiations -- that the representative of Sweden has asked the United States, as she did on 4 August (ibid., pp. 7, 8), for further information about the accuracy with which seismic events can be located. As she reminded us, accurate location of the point of origin of a seismic signal is one of the means of identification. If the epicentre is not on land, presumably the signals come from an earthquake. In addition, accurate location of an event would certainly simplify the task of on-site inspection.

In response to Mrs. Myrdal's request, we have introduced a technical working paper (ENDC/182) which describes the problem of determining the location of seismic events. Since these technical matters are fully set out in the working paper, I shall not take up the time of the Committee to describe them now. The present state of our ability in this field results from research which we have already carried out. Further experiments are planned for the near future. We hope the results of that research will contribute to the achievement of our objective: an adequately-verified comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Many delegations have expressed anxiety that the nuclear arms race may enter a more dangerous phase if development and large-scale deployment of anti-ballistic missiles take place. I think it is fair to say that I have never heard that concern so eloquently expressed as it was in the concluding remarks of the representative of the United Kingdom. In view of that concern I should like to turn to another proposal now before the Committee which demonstrates that it does have before it important measures which would have a real effect on the crucial problems of the day. I refer to our proposal to explore a freeze of the number and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

At our meeting on 16 August (ENDC/PV.282, pp. 14 et seq.) I explained that anti-ballistic missiles would be included in a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. I also explained in some detail why it was essential that those missiles should be included. Detailed negotiations have, unfortunately, not yet developed; and only recently have the reasons for and the importance of including anti-ballistic missiles in a freeze proposal begun to receive the attention that they deserve. However, we welcome the fact that the non-aligned memorandum on non-proliferation indicates that a freeze of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons would be a tangible step relating both to non-proliferation and to halting the nuclear arms race.

It is our conviction that the exploration of a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as exploration of the possibility of significant reductions in those vehicles if progress is made towards a freeze, constitutes important future business for this Committee. Agreement on that proposal to halt and turn back the arms race would facilitate progress towards our common goal of general and complete disarmament. Such progress would also be facilitated if we could agree to establish a working group to study, without pre-conditions, the levels of strategic delivery vehicles to be retained during the various stages of disarmament.

Finally, I should like now to return to a proposal which was contained in the seventh point of President Johnson's message to this conference on 27 January 1966 (ENDC/165) and which was described by Mr. Foster on 19 April (ENDC/PV.257, p.15 et seq.). It is the proposal that on a regional basis countries explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige. President Johnson pointed out that the initiative for such arrangements should of course come from the regions concerned. He said: "If such arrangements can be worked out and assurance can be given that they will be observed, the United States stands ready to respect them." (ENDC/165, p.3)

The benefits of regional undertakings to restrict the importation of arms could be enormous. For many countries the exciting and challenging tasks of social, industrial and agricultural growth are just beginning. Those tasks should not be impeded by the burdens of spending on unnecessary armaments. I think we could all take inspiration from the remarks made on the subject by the representative of Nigeria on 18 August, when he said:

"Nowhere in the world is there a more urgent need to implement that proposal than on the continent of Africa, where most of the countries are engaged with all the limited resources at their command in the grim battle against poverty. They have very little or nothing to spare for the purchase of arms. But there are quite a few countries of that continent today actively engaged in the arms race and

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creating as a result an atmosphere of fear and anxiety. My delegation believes that this problem should be tackled simultaneously from two sides. The African countries themselves should initiate discussions on how to check the inflow of arms into the continent, and the supplying countries should exercise restraint and show a greater sense of proportion in the matter." (ENDC/PV.283, p.13)

The United States hopes that the members of this Committee can play a key role in stimulating interest in that approach in their own regions.

I should like to take a few minutes more to read to the Committee several excerpts from an address by President Johnson regarding the Alliance for Progress in the Western Hemisphere. I should like to do so because the address states eloquently the challenges before us and the importance of avoiding any needless spending on armaments. Although the President's address was made with regard to the Alliance for Progress, I believe it may have far broader relevance. He stated that the republics of the western hemisphere have shown -

"...that deep social change is compatible with peace, is consistent with democracy and is consonant with individual liberty. We have sounded a sure and certain note: namely, that great changes can be wrought by reason and not rifles, by builders and not bullets."

The President went on to state: "The resources required for these tasks must not be needlessly spent on arms." After noting that military budgets in Latin America were not exceptionally large, he pointed out that there was a recurrent tendency everywhere to seek expensive weapons with little relevance to the real requirements of security and that this tendency was often reinforced by competition among neighbouring countries. He concluded by saying:

"We just must find a way to avoid the cost of procuring and maintaining unnecessary military equipment that will take clothes off the back and food from the stomach and education away from the minds of our children. For these are some of the basic tasks -- and only some -- which lie before us as we try today to fulfil the promise of the modern world in which we are so privileged to live."

As we conclude this session of our Conference, it seems fair to say that the vital matters before this Committee are being dealt with in a way which greatly enhances the likelihood of further progress. On our key subject of non-proliferation, there are prospects for agreement if all sides can negotiate in a spirit of mutual adjustment, common understanding and compromise -- in short, in a spirit of rapprochement.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): At this final stage of our work at this session, I too should like to make a few brief comments on behalf of the Romanian delegation.

As all of us observe, we are once again faced with the necessity of referring to the United Nations General Assembly for its examination of the items which were entrusted to us, without being able to report any progress whatsoever. Even to those who take no part in our work it is clear that it would be difficult to make progress towards disarmament when one of the participants in the negotiations is undertaking actions which are contrary to international security and gravely endanger the peace of the whole world. I refer, as you all know, to the armed aggression of the United States in Viet-Nam, which is -- whether it is recognized or not -- one of the factors having a paralysing effect on our negotiations.

As we know, there is a very close and organic connexion between the general policy of a State and its position in regard to disarmament. As Mr. Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, recently declared:

"There is a flagrant incompatibility between the continuation and the extension of the war in Viet-Nam, and the alleged desire of the United States to go along the road to disarmament. It is not possible to declare oneself in Geneva in favour of agreements on disarmament, and to wage at the same time a war of aggression against another people. Through its actions the United States is creating serious obstacles to the search for solutions in this matter, as well as in regard to the solution of other urgent international questions."

That is why we have always insisted that, if progress is desired in regard to disarmament, the aggressive actions of the United States against the Viet-Namese people must be ended; the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam must cease; United States troops, as well as all other foreign armed forces, must be withdrawn from South Viet-Nam; the sacred right of the Viet-Namese people to decide their future themselves without any interference from outside must be respected; the Geneva Agreements of 1954 must be strictly observed.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

The present international situation necessitates more than ever the concentration of efforts in the essential task which was assigned to us, namely, general and complete disarmament and, in the first place, nuclear disarmament. The Romanian delegation associates itself with the opinion expressed by a number of other delegations which have rightly pointed out that insufficient attention has been devoted to precisely these essential questions. We hope that the ideas that will emerge during the debates at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly will help to give the negotiations on this subject the impetus that is so much needed.

The picture of the real situation would be incomplete if we did not mention the efforts made in this Committee to overcome the standstill in our work. In this connexion I venture to refer both to the various proposals emanating from the delegations of the socialist countries and to the contributions made by the delegations of the nonaligned States, as reflected in the documents which they have recently submitted to our Committee (ENDC/177, 178, 180). These are initiatives the significance of which, I am convinced, is obvious to everyone, and which will make their full weight felt during our future debates.

As far as we are concerned, taking into account the need to find generally-acceptable solutions in order to ensure international peace and security, we should like once again to stress the priority which from every point of view - practical, humanitarian, logical, moral and legal - should be assigned to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In this respect the lack of a solemn international document intended to be universal could in no case be adduced in order to justify ignoring this necessity when any agreement relating to disarmament is being worked out. We should also like to reaffirm our support for the establishment of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world, the nuclear Powers giving at the same time an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries.

The ultimate aim of disarmament is to ensure international peace and security for all States. The whole evolution of the international situation has once again demonstrated that the security of States cannot be based on the existence of military blocs, on the division of the world into opposing groups. International security can be achieved only by a convergence of bilateral and multilateral relationships towards peaceful co-operation based on strict respect for the principles of sovereignty, national independence, full equality of rights, and non-interference in the internal

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

affairs of States. This obviously necessitates the elimination of foreign military bases on the territory of other countries and the withdrawal of the armed forces stationed on such territory to within their own national borders.

Of course, we are also aware of the objections which some people raise in regard to the disarmament measures to which I have just referred. We are told: "They are good, but they are neither for today nor for tomorrow". I would ask -- in order to reply to the objection concerning the alleged untimeliness of these measures -- whether progress in our negotiations here has not been hampered precisely by the fact that we have left aside, as lacking any topical value, such measures as would be likely to clear the way for progress in the disarmament negotiations.

I think it would be useful to stress not only the efforts made by many delegations in this Committee but also those which have been undertaken outside this Committee by many States in order to enable the cause of disarmament, peace and an international détente to make headway. In this respect I should like to recall the Declaration on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe adopted by the socialist States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which were represented at the meeting in Bucharest of the Consultative Political Committee.

I should like to express once again our firm conviction that the safeguarding of peace imposes great responsibilities on all peoples, on all States, on all governments, each country, great or small, having a contribution to make. As regards the contribution of small countries, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Mr. Ion Choroghe Maurer, stated some days ago during his visit in Denmark:

"Through their active participation when these problems are taken up and discussed within the United Nations Organization, as well as in other international forums and bodies, through their initiatives and their actions the small countries can render great service not only to their own peoples but also to the whole world, which desires international peace and co-operation".

In this connexion I should like to recall the initiative taken by the Socialist Republic of Romania and approved by resolution 2129 (XX), unanimously adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, concerning the improvement of good-neighbourly relations among European States having different social and political systems.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

As has been noted during the recent visits by Romanian leaders in various countries, and on the occasion of the contacts which have been made during visits to Romania by political leaders from other countries, there is great concern both to develop reciprocal relations and to base the relations between States and between peoples on the fundamental principles of international law, namely strict respect for the principles of sovereignty, national independence, equality of rights, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, mutual advantage, and assurance of the inalienable right of each people to decide its future itself.

A new session of the General Assembly of the United Nations is about to begin. The Romanian delegation will do everything in its power to further any measure likely to lead to the development of a climate of international co-operation, to facilitate progress towards disarmament and to promote international peace and security.

I should not like to conclude these comments without expressing all the gratitude of the Romanian delegation to Mr. Protitch, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization, to Mr. Epstein, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization, and to all those who have helped with competence and devotion to ensure good working conditions for the Committee.

ADOPTION OF REPORT

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The next matter on our agenda is the adoption of the Committee's report (ENDC/184) to be transmitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the United Nations General Assembly. The draft report is before the Committee. Does any representative wish to make any comment or observation on it? If not, I shall take it that the Committee approves the report.

The report was adopted.

COMMUNIQUE

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 286th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A. A. Roshchin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States and Romania.

"The Conference adopted a report on the Committee's deliberations for the period 27 January 1966 to 25 August 1966 to be transmitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on a date to be decided by the two co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee, as soon as possible after termination of the consideration of the question of disarmament at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly."

CLOSURE OF SESSION

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Before closing the meeting I should like, in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union and as Chairman of today's meeting, to express our gratitude to Mr. Protitch, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to his Deputy, Mr. Epstein, to the interpreters, who played a very substantial part in our negotiations, to the verbatim reports and typists, who have also helped the Committee substantially in its work, and to all members of the staff who have ensured the conduct of the negotiations and assisted the Committee in its work.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.